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  The following suggests that demographic changes and the creation of a single 
currency in Europe has compelled greater EU intervention in pension reform.  
Although, traditionally pension reform has remained the domain of the domestic 
realm, increased European integration has necessitated lifting the issue of pension 
reform to the EU level.  Capital flows among EU member states, the economic 
dependence among members of EMU and the unique institutional structure of the EU 
has facilitated increased attention at the EU level regarding pension reform.   
Politically, the EU presents a unique condition since national governments can use 
Brussels as a scapegoat to implement contested policies such as pension reform and 
accountability at the EU level is distinct from democratic configurations within 
member states also facilitating change within a highly contested policy area.  
Economically, the almost complete economic integration after the introduction of the 
Euro, means that countries are ever more dependent on policy choices in other 
Member States: no longer are countries able to keep all the benefits of prefunding, 
like increased investment, within their own borders.  
This study concludes that both the political and economic importance of the EU and 
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Introduction 
Impetus for pension policy reform is no longer dependent solely upon domestic 
economic factors and domestic political actors.  In the context of the European Union 
(EU), global factors are shaping and perhaps driving the pension reform agenda.  
Specifically, the contribution of pension funds to foreign capital markets and 
deepening European integration have facilitated lifting the issue of pension reform 
from the domestic to the international arena.  In particular, demographic shifts and 
international capital flows have created an economic necessity for members of the 
EU to coordinate pension reform.  As a result, the unique institutional structure of the 
EU has enabled the European Commission to act as a significant domestic agenda 
setter regarding pension reform.   
Many advanced industrialized countries are facing a crisis, as current pension policies 
become incapable of dealing with demographic changes.  Across Europe and North 
America significant demographic shifts are occurring as life expectancy increases, 
population growth declines and the baby boomer generation leaves behind a legacy of 
a baby bust (see appendix).  As a result of these changes, individuals who have paid 
into public pension systems may reap only meager benefits.  As forecasters predict 
the failure of current pension schemes policy-makers are struggling to find policy 
solutions to ameliorate the situation. 
Expenditure on pensions accounts for between 5% and 20% of GDP in most OECD 
countries and accounts for nearly half of government payments for social protection.  
When the baby boomers start to reach retirement age in ten years time, government 
budgets will feel the impact.  Reform of pension systems has been a major topic in 
many domestic policy debates over the last decades.  Past studies suggest that strong 
labor unions, public protest
2 or a country’s institutional structures have defined and 
shaped pension policy reform (Epsing-Andersen, 1990, 1985; Flora, 1986; Ross, 
2000; Guillén, 1999, 1992; Schmitter and Lembruch, 1979; Bonoli, 2000).  Due to 
pension reform’s controversial nature and since state run schemes are financed with 
national tax money, it is commonly assumed that pension reform does not and will 
not enter the realm of international politics
3.   
Today, however, changes in global finance and supranational institutions’ influence 
upon domestic social and political structures have introduced a new dynamic to 
pension policy formulation.  In the context of Western Europe, this has become 
increasingly apparent with deepening integration.  Many incremental policy steps in 
the European Union have not only introduced pension reform policies high on the 
European agenda, but also the particular nature of the Union itself enables and 
facilitates lifting the issue from the domestic to the international arena. 
                                                                 
2 For example, in France during Alain Juppé’s term and in Italy under Silvio Berlusconi the public protest regarding 
pension reform were massive and significantly contributed to the fall of these governments. 
3 The World Bank has research and a program for how to establish or reform pension schemes.  However, the World 
Bank's policy prescription is merely a guide to following successful practices, or learning from other countries' mistakes 
but, virtually no international coordination is suggested in this program.  Similarly many Latin American countries have 
copied part of the Chilean reform, however no political bargaining among countries has occurred.         6 
Thus, in light of global changes, how have international economic and political forces 
affected the impetus for pension policy reform?  More specifically, has the unique 
situation of an integrated Europe affected such reform? 
  To answer these questions, we will specifically address two related research 
questions: 
 
1. To what extent does the global economy affect pension reform?  In particular, do 
moneys invested in private pension funds affect international capital flows and in turn 
influence other countries to adopt or refrain from adopting private pension systems? 
 
2. To what extent does the European Union influence member state pension policy 
agenda setting?        7 
Ageing in a global context 
 
In 1994, the World Bank’s publication  Averting the old age crisis warned 
governments around the world of the future increase in the size of t he elderly 
population that would threaten current pension schemes.  Particularly developing 
countries are forecasted to face a large increase in the elderly population as can be 
seen in table 1: 
 
Table 1: Over 60 as a percentage of the total population 
 
 
  1999  2050 
Africa  5  12 
Asia  9  24 
Europe  20  35 
Latin American and the 
Caribbean 
8  22 
Northern America  16  28 
Oceania  13  24 
 
Source: Web site of the United Nations Development Program 
 
 
The World Bank’s report marked a considerable shift in international policy-making 
away from preoccupations over a growing population and the strain it puts on natural 
resources.  Instead the report focused on a world population mainly composed of 
elderly and its consequence for economic and social policy.  To remedy this situation, 
the World Bank strongly advocated a three-pillar structure for the provision of 
pensions, whose structure is summarized in the following table:       8 
 
Table 2: Three pillar system as advocated by the World Bank (1994) 
 
  First pillar  Second pillar  Third pillar 
Providor/contract
or 
Government  Occupational 






plans or long 
term savings 
accounts 
Present nature  PAYG (almost 
always) 
Funded or PAYG  Funded 
Ideal Nature 
(WB) 
PAYG  Funded  Funded 





To cater for 
individual 
preferences 
Secondary Aim    Increase national savings and thereby 
growth 
Ideal Size  Max 10% of total 
wages in 
economy 




The first pillar is composed of a publicly provided scheme, like Social Security in the 
United States.  In almost all cases it is on a pure Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) basis, 
which means that current pension outlays are financed by current taxation and social 
security contributions.  Ideally it should redistribute some money from the rich (they 
pay more taxes during their life) to the poor, such that all pensioners are above the 
poverty line.  Chile is an example of a country, which put this first pillar on a funded 
basis and now a number of Latin American countries have followed suit. 
The second pillar is negotiated between employers and employees and work-related.  
The money is used as a supplementary pension over the state pension.  For private 
companies it should be funded in some way.  That means that current contributions 
are saved and invested and paid out inclusive of their return, when the current 
generation retires.  In some countries, most notably Germany and Italy, the money 
may be kept inside the company as a book reserve and is used as an inexpensive 
source of finance.  This or even a company-run PAYG system is risky, because a 
company can default.  Many (semi)-governmental organizations do run their 
"company"-plan on a PAYG-basis. 
The third pillar r efers to individual investments made to supplement pension 
payments.  These often receive favorable tax-treatment if they are specifically 
earmarked for retirement, like the 401(k) plan in the U.S.  Without exception this 
money is invested in an individual account. 
 
       9 
Some notes on economic theory and pensions 
Pension reforms in the Western world are essentially taking two forms: 
Tightening of rules for qualifying for benefits: For example the retirement age is 
raised (in the US from 65 to 67), more years of contributions are needed to qualify for 
a (full) pension and the actual pensions paid are less generous. 
Increase in the funded part of pension provision: This is done by either bolstering the 
second and third pillars, making sure that they are on a funded basis or by (partially) 
pre-funding state run PAYG systems.  An example of the first policy is setting up 
extra tax-incentives for company plans or making them compulsory in certain 
circumstances.  Examples of the second policy include the Social Security Trust Fund 
in the U.S., The Silver Fund in Belgium and the Oil Reserve Fund in Norway.   
 
The aim of raising the qualifying age for retirement is to keep the budget balanced.  
In addition, it renders the system more equitable by eliminating privileges of certain 
groups in society.  Increasing the funded portion of pension provisions is far more 
ambitious and costly.  Pre-funding essentially means that current contributions will 
have to pay for current pensions and also for a capital reserve, which is being built up 
to fund future pension payments.  It thereby puts a heavy burden on current 
generations and favors future ones. 
 
On the equivalence between PAYG pension systems and explicit public debt 
When a government runs a budget deficit, it borrows money to compensate for the 
shortfall and to that purpose issues explicit public debt.  PAYG pension systems are a 
form of implicit public debt since there is a more or less explicit promise to current 
contributors that they will receive pensions in their retirement.  The system cannot be 
terminated without either continuing paying benefits to people who have accumulated 
rights or defaulting partially or completely.  The current implicit debt of a PAYG 
pension scheme equals the net present value of the accumulated rights of the system 
as of today.  In many OECD members, the implicit PAYG debt amply exceeds 
formal government debt and gives a good indication of the future pension liabilities 
of many governments
4.  Pre-funding essentially aims to offset these with tangible 
assets in the form of pension funds (be it in the public or the private sector).  This is 
important when considering the Maastricht treaty, which contains a ceiling on 
explicit public debt, namely 60% of GDP, but is completely silent on implicit debt 
and the sustainability of public pension schemes. 
 
Relative merits of PAYG systems and fully funded systems 
To design an optimal pension scheme it is useful to discuss the relative merits of the 
PAYG and fully funded pension schemes.  We shall start with  the merits at the 
micro-level: what does it give the average pensioner?  A pension is an insurance 
policy for the risk that somebody lives long.  The first question is how much return 
contributions deliver (before redistribution effects)? In an equilibrium PAYG system, 
the return a government can pay equals the growth of the wage base (on which it 
                                                                 
4 See Auerbach et al. (1999)       10
imposes contributions), which roughly equals real GDP growth and is expected to be 
between 2% to 3% in the foreseeable future.  The baby boom is a temporary 
departure from equilibrium.  One way to manage this disequilibrium is to build up 
resources in a trust fund, when individuals work and paying them out, when they 
retire.  These trust funds do not alter the fundamental arithmetic.   
Currently a funded system can earn an almost risk-free return of just over 3% real per 
annum by investing in indexed government bonds or taking more risk by investing in 
stocks, which historically have earned a real 9% pre-tax and 5.4% after tax return 
(Feldstein, 1999).  An appropriate mix of investment instruments, which also 
includes real estate, is mostly advocated to earn a higher return.  According to 
standard investment theories, it is optimal to invest in as wide a range of assets as 
possible, as long as their returns are not perfectly correlated.  This means that one 
should find an optimal mix between all available investments.  Pension funds, 
however, can only trade in publicly available assets, whereas a PAYG system 
provides access to a non-traded asset, namely the human capital of workers
5, which is 
measured by their wage.  So for an individual it is optimal to have a mix of both 
systems, though opinions on the exact mix differ. 
Optimal decisions at the individual level do not necessarily coincide with optimality 
at the aggregate level.  Funding itself is perceived to have inherent advantages, 
because when done in the right way
6 it will increase national savings.  If a country is 
able to keep national savings and invest them within its own borders, this will deepen 
capital markets and increase long-term investment, which will in turn have two 
consequences.  Firstly, a lower rate of return (interest rate) on these long-term 
investment will take place, because of the abundance of capital, and secondly a 
higher wage rate will occur
7, because the increased capital makes labor more 
productive.   
 
A small two country model 
Consider two identical countries A and B, which form an economic union.  Between 
them capital flows freely, but people do not move between the two countries.  This is 
an abstract model of the European economy, where on average only 0.4% of the 
population moves from one state to another (In the US, the figure for interstate moves 
is about 6 times as high).  In the beginning, both countries (of equal size) run a 
PAYG pension system and have a certain capital stock.  This stock is relatively low 
and consequently wages are low and interest rates are high.  Now country A decides 
to prefund its future pension obligations.  In period two it builds up extra capital 
stock.  One main consequence is that the people in country A in period 2 consume 
less.  Country B continues to run a PAYG pension system. 
                                                                 
5 See Merton (1984)  
6 If a trust fund is just built up by writing out I.O.U.’s to it, as some authors charge the American government does with 
the trust fund, then it evidently does not raise national savings.  If however the government would have issued that 
national debt publicly in the absence of the trust fund, then it does raise aggregate savings.  Another objection levied is 
that if the pension fund buys riskier assets like stocks instead of bonds, then the whole change can be undone if private 
citizens lower their stocks holding by an equal amount and thereby offset the transaction.  As many households do not 
privately own stocks, the effect can at most be partial. 
7 We are making the common assumption that capital and labor are substitutes.       11
Prefunding country A accumulates extra savings, which is invested. Free movement 
of capital means that they will be invested in  the most productive place available. 
This means that equal parts are invested in both countries:  investment decisions 
require that the capital/labor ratio is equal, such that capital is equally productive in 
both countries and the profit made on investments is equal.  So country A invests half 
of its extra assets at home and half abroad.  After the reform the interest and dividend 
payments from country B pay for part of the pension outlay.  The extra capital also 
has an affect on equilibrium wages and interest rates: it implies that labor becomes 
more productive and that wages hence rise.  The abundance of capital leads to a fall 
in interest rates.  See figure 1 below: 
Country B, which has taken no policy action by itself, has been profoundly affected 
by the reform in country A: the wages of its citizens are higher, whereas the interest 
rates are lower.  These effects mean that it is now less optimal for B to reform as 
well: lower interest rates make a PAYG system relatively more attractive with respect 
to a funded system: it is now (even) less inclined to follow the reform.  If on top of 
that the growth rate in the area has also increased ,as Feldstein (1999) argues, then the 
balance swings even further against reform.  The question remains, however, why 
country A would prefund in the first place since part of the benefits accrue to the 
citizens of country B, whereas the cost (temporary higher tax rates and lower 
consumption) falls on its own citizens. 
Pemberton (1999, 2000) therefore argues that countries s hould cooperate in 
reforming their pension systems: he even offers some examples of models in which 
the prefunding does not lead to a decrease in consumption in welfare as higher wages 
more than compensate.  We consider the last examples (which are based on models       12
with large increasing returns to scale in the production function) unlikely to be 
realistic, but completely follow his first argument on the need to coordinate pension 
reforms.   
Omtzigt (2001) also argues that reforms would proceed much faster if they were 
coordinated: at the moment each country only internalizes the gain from its own 
reform in the decision making process and takes the gain from the other country's 
reform as given.  An optimal reform (from a welfare point of view) would require 
coordination, which could take place by means of an amendment to the European 
treaties.  Note the clear differences between the two ways of reforming in table 3 
below: 
 
Table 3: Relative merits of competitive and coordinated reform 
Competitive reform   Coordinated reform 
Each country internalizes only the 
gains of its own reform 
Each country internalizes its own 
reform and reforms in other countries 
Slow prefunding  Prefunding takes place at a faster 
pace 
Large domestic opposition to reform  Little resistance to reform 
 
 
Now consider the entry decision of a country.  If a country has large pension reserves 
and therefore a large capital stock, it will undergo a capital outflow upon entering an 
economic union, as capital will be able to earn a slightly better r ate of return 
elsewhere.  This gain is however more than offset by the fall in wages due to a lower 
capital intensity.  So the model predicts that countries with high pension reserves 
should be less inclined to enter an economic union than countries with a low level of 
reserves. 
Economic and monetary union is of crucial importance to the economic story above: 
pensions are without exception denominated in domestic currency.  Before EMU 
investing in another country meant assuming an additional exchange rate risk for the 
pension fund.  Consequently even in countries where pension funds had the liberty to 
invest a large part of their assets abroad, pension funds did not do so.  The Dutch 
pension funds, which together with the UK pension funds, were not subject to any 
investment limits
8 in the mid 1990s, increased their holdings in foreign assets from 
40% of total assets at the end of 1998 to 64% at the end of 2000
9.  UK international 
pension fund holdings on the other hand have been constant at around 27% of total 
assets for the last eight years
10 
 
Pension fund assets in Europe 
Different European Countries have vastly different amounts of funded pension 
reserves.  The following figures from Phillips & Davis (2000) and Mercer (2000) 
                                                                 
8 Apart from a 5% self-investment limit.  Source: European Commission (1997) 
9 Source: CBS (Dutch Statistical Agency), several on-line press releases: www.cbs.nl 
10 Phillips & Drew (2000), figure 2.9       13
concern aggregate funded reserves for old ages and therefore include certain forms of 
life insurance: 
 
Table 4: Pension assets as a % of GDP 
 
Non-EU, non-EEA member 
Switzerland  127 
Non-EU, EEA member 
Norway  34 
EU, non-EMU members 
Sweden  118 
Denmark  115 
UK  93 
EU, EMU members 
Netherlands  117 
Ireland  54 
Finland  50 
Italy  23 
Germany  15 
Belgium  14 
Austria  12 
Portugal  12 
France  5 
Spain  5 
 
 
A clear picture emerges: countries, which do not participate in EMU (and even stay 
out of the EU and European Economic Area), have far higher pension reserves than 
countries taking part in EMU.   
Apparently there are two exceptions to this rule: Norway and the Netherlands.  
Norway however has a state-owned 'Petroleum Reserve Fund', which since 1990 
invests the income of Norwegian North Sea oil.  The fund is explicitly earmarked for 
future pension payments.  Its assets reached 23% of GDP in 2000, but are excepted to 
increase to 74% of GDP by 2004, as oil revenues peak in this relatively short period.  
The Netherlands is a truly unique case since despite having one of the highest 
pension reserves in Europe, it does participate in EMU and has seen its pension 
investments flow to other countries at a massive scale.   
 
Reforms currently under way in the single EU Member-States 
The economic model above helps to explain two things: 
Entry into a single Monetary Union and pension funds: countries with high pension 
reserves should be reluctant to enter such a union       14
Reform efforts in and outside the monetary union: reform efforts should be much 
weaker for  countries inside the union (as long as coordination is absent) than for 
countries outside the union.   
The first point is explained above (with the exception of the Netherlands).  The 
second point is slightly more delicate, as it asks for a measurement of the pre-funding 
effort by the various countries.  We, however, argue that only three countries have 
taken bold policy measures aimed at increasing pre-funding in the last 5 years: the 
UK, Sweden and Ireland. 
On April 6 2001, stakeholders pensions were introduced in the United Kingdom.  
Under this scheme, almost everybody can make tax-deductible pension contributions 
to privately run pension schemes: it is particularly aimed at low earners and those that 
do not have access to company schemes and partly replaces the State Earnings 
Related Pension Schemes.  The last one is financed on a PAYG-basis, whereas the 
stakeholders pensions are all prefunded.  It is difficult to predict how many people 
will take out the new pension and thus how much extra prefunding is involved.  (the 
British government massively under predicted how many people would opt out 
during an earlier reform in the 1980s).  It is clear, however, that after the introduction 
of these pensions, almost everybody potentially has access to funded schemes.  As 
the British state pension is below the poverty line and still falling relatively to 
average wages (some extra benefits are still available to those who only have the state 
pension), this step completes the long process of privatizing and prefunding, started 
by Mrs.  Thatcher (for an overview, see Disney (1996)). 
The Swedish Pension Reform Act of 1998 (Lag om inkomstgrundad ålderspension) 
stipulates that employees have to pay 18.5% of their income in pension contributions, 
of which 2.5% are in state-approved defined-benefit pension funds.  This means that 
an extra 1.5% of GDP is being used for prefunding from January 1, 2001 onwards.  
The National Pensions Reserve Fund Act (2000) in Ireland instituted a Reserve Fund 
in which the government deposits a sum equal to 1% of GDP each year.  The trustees 
of the fund decide on the asset mix and the fund is run outside the government sector, 
such that contributions to it do count as current outlays of the government.  This is 
important, as Ireland will have to run a higher surplus before the transfer in order not 
to run the risk to hit the 3% deficit limit. 
Other pension reforms in Europe are much more timid in nature: the 2001 German 
reform also introduces a funded element, just like Sweden, but this is set at only 0.5% 
initially
11.  At the same time the state pensions are only marginally lowered in the 
future, such that the total contribution rate will still rise substantially in the future.  
The Italian pension reforms of 1992, 1995 and 1997 all aimed to increase the funded 
part of the Italian pension system, but as yet no real increase has taken place in 
pension funds (Covip, 2000).  The Spanish government has introduced a fund, similar 
to the Irish one, but deposits only 0.1% of GDP each year.  The Dutch and Belgians 
have opted for a retirement fund within the public sector, filled with only government 
debt.  
                                                                 
11 The original plan was far bolder, but parliament made deep changes to it.         15
 In this way, the yearly contributions of the order of maximum 0.5% of GDP, are not 
classified as expenditure under the Maastricht rules and therefore do not count for the 
3% deficit limit.  Therefore they are just accounting identities and do not represent 
genuine efforts to prefund.  In 2000 French prime-minister Jospin withdrew his 
pension reform act in the face of opposition: it would have marginally increased the 
role of prefunding by means of a state fund, but opposition was too fierce.  Thus, two 
out of the three countries outside EMU, who least need it (they have the lowest age-
dependency ratio in 2040 and already very high pension reserves) increased their 
efforts to prefund, whereas of the EMU-members only Ireland took a fairly bold step. 
The Irish situation is in fact very special from an economic point of view: its 
economy is booming with sustained growth rates of around 7% per year and the 
government records budget surpluses.  Euro interest rates are too low by any standard 
for Ireland and the only solution to cool down the economy is to tighten budgetary 
policy.  This is politically completely unfeasible.  This pension fund was the only 
kind of expenditure, which does not further fuel the economic boom and at the same 
time is acceptable to voters.  Still Ireland became the first country that received a 
reprimand from the other EMU members under the Maastricht rules for excessive 
spending.   
Thus,  it is clear that according to economic theory cooperation and coordination 
between countries is beneficial as the advantages of a deeper capital market and 
higher wages will now be spread over both countries. Moreover the resulting fall in 
equilibrium interest rates and possible increase in economic growth rates will mean 
that the country, which has opted for prefunding has effectively enabled the other 
country to maintain a PAYG system. Economic desirability of cooperation, however, 
does not in any way imply political desirability or feasibility.  The political process is 
therefore studied in the next paragraph. 
 
Pension Reform in an Integrated Europe 
  The global economy and more specifically an integrated Europe have created 
an environment necessitating the coordination of pension reform.  Pensions initially 
were created to appease certain pressure groups or to alleviate poverty however; 
today pensions are ‘big business’.  Although the previous discussion suggests that 
international economic conditions and  demographic changes dictate the need for 
pension policy reform, political factors will determine if such reform will actually 
occur.  Willingness on the part of political leaders and the limiting or lack of political 
pressure from societal groups, particularly labor organizations, will determine the 
success and depth of pension reform. 
  The EU provides a special institutional framework that binds together member 
states and places limits on member state policies.  For example, the convergence 
criteria to enter the European Monetary Union place constraints on government 
public spending.  The 3% limit on deficit spending inhibits member states’ public 
expenditure and also helps member states to implement traditionally unpopular 
austerity measures.  Increasing political and economic integration has placed the EU 
in a very unique position.  EU policies greatly affect and transform domestic       16
policies
12.  The EU seems to have an unusual position providing not only constraints 
upon member state policy making, but also acting as a possible policy agenda setter 
within member states. 
Discussions of the EU often disregard the notion of the EU becoming involved in 
social policy (Lange, 1992).  Similarly, Ferrera and Rhodes (2000) suggest that 
although external pressures are  important, it is “domestically generated pressures” 
that will bring about change of the welfare state, of which pension policy is a central 
component (p.20).  Moreover, “to the extent that external constraints are important, 
they do no render impossible diverse institutional and normative designs for the 
welfare state.”(Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000: 20).  Similarly, Clark (2000) asserts that 
the variation of pension policies across European countries will persist, however, we 
will witness an attempt at accommodating pension policies to the Anglo-American 
model.  
According to Liebfried and Pierson (1996) social policy in the European Union is 
shared among different levels of government (national, sub-national/regional and 
supranational), thus creating a “multi-tiered” political system.  The EU, including its 
policies and institutional structure in Brussels, has fundamentally affected the 
responsibility and competency over policy sectors that national and sub-national 
governments once enjoyed (Dudek, 2001; Marks et al. 1996).  Most significant is the 
EU’s role in monetary and regulatory policy, which was traditionally the 
responsibility of national governments.  Social policy, however, is claimed to have 
remained mostly in the hands of national governments “but their influence has been 
increasingly circumscribed and embedded in a dense, complex institutional 
environment” (Liebfried and Pierson, 1996: 4).  
It seems that as national governments become more involved with one another within 
an institutional framework, as embodied in Brussels, there is more opportunity for the 
transference of pension reform policy options and ideas across borders.  In addition, 
as European countries find their economies closely linked to their neighbors', 
pressures may arise from other member states or the EU itself to convince countries 
to adopt more sound policy initiatives.  For instance, in a recent European 
Commission communication the Commission has acknowledged that pensions is a 
matter for member states to legislate, but the Commission suggests that member 
states should adopt a mixed pension system (European Commission, 2000).  We 
suggest that as of yet there is no push to create a European run pension system.  
Instead, the EU, and in particular the Commission, is beginning to play a significant 
role in setting the agenda within member states to adopt not only more sound pension 
policies, but also specific policy prescriptions.  
 
Theoretical Examination of Domestic Influences on Pension Policy 
  Pension reform is a particularly salient and highly sensitive issue.  Many 
countries at different points in time have attempted to reform their pension systems 
but have been met with opposition due to domestic pressures.  For instance, in Italy in 
1970 experts realized the need for structural changes in the pension system, however 
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it was not until 1992 that reform was actually begun under the Amato government 
(Antichi and Pizzuti, 2000).  Reform in Italy was only possible due to their desire to 
re-enter the European Monetary System and the inclusion of labor in the policy 
making structure (Antichi and Pizzuti, 2000). 
  Within the study of public policy there are many explanations to account for 
the kinds of policies chosen and how policies can be changed.  In the context of 
pension policy in Western Europe it is evident that policies that have been adopted 
vary greatly among countries.  Historically, the initial division of pension policy 
schemes stems from the introduction of social policies in the late 1800’s and early 
1900’s.  The two models that set the foundation of pension policy were the 
Bismarckian social insurance and Beveridge’s
13 poverty prevention scheme (Bonoli, 
2000).  Bismarck introduced his scheme in 1889, which was a program to allow 
retired industrial workers to receive a pension related to their earnings while they 
were working.  On the other hand, the Beveridge plan was a means-tested pension 
scheme to aid the poor (Bonoli, 2000; Myles and Quadagno, 1997). 
  These two models of pension policies were chosen in order to accomplish very 
different goals.  Bismark chose to implement a social policy to quell discontent 
among industrial workers.  For instance, in conjunction with his pension scheme he 
also had legislation to ban the political organization of workers (Bonoli, 2000).  No 
pension provisions were given to other groups other than industrial workers since 
they did not pose a political threat.  On the other hand, the Beveridge model, which 
the Danish actually first introduced prior to the publication of the Beveridge Plan, 
was meant to help alleviate poverty.  Thus, it is apparent that the creation of pension 
policy was created to achieve very different purposes in different countries.   
  Since its inception, the political and economic implications of pension policies 
have changed significantly.  Pensions are the cornerstone of the welfare state, 
providing a significant source of government substantive legitimacy.  As the benefits 
and coverage of pensions have expanded, so to have citizen expectations.  Moreover, 
as discussed earlier, pensions contibute significantly to national GNP.  When 
considering pension reform it is important to take into account the significant 
political and economic implications.  Thus, it is a complex matter to understand why 
certain policy options are chosen.  Why do countries choose certain pension schemes 
and why has the reform of pensions been such a slow moving process?  To answer 
such questions there are various perspectives that have been adopted.  We suggest 
that there are four main schools to understanding pension reform which emphasize: 
industrialization, institutions, ideas and political mobilization. 
  The ‘logic of industrialization’ was an earlier school of thought regarding 
pension policy.  It suggested that industrialization had created conditions that 
necessitated the creation of social policy.  Bonoli (2000) points out that such a theory 
became difficult to support as the link between economic development and pension 
provisions seemed to be more tenuous.  For instance, Bonoli (2000) proposes that the 
United States and Sweden compared provides a useful example to discount the ‘logic 
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of industrialization’ since both countries have comparable economic development but 
differ considerably regarding the kinds of social benefits provided. 
  The ‘logic of  industrialization’ attempted to use economic conditions as an 
explanatory variable to determine social policy adoption.  Today, the global economy 
and EMU present a new dynamic that has the potential to influence the kinds of 
policies adopted. For instance, although not directly related to pension policy, in Italy 
and Spain severe budgetary austerity programs were instituted.  In the case of Spain 
austerity measures were implemented to allow for European Community membership 
and to enable Spain to enter the European Monetary System (EMS).  In the case of 
Italy, in 1992 following Italy’s exit from the EMS a restrictive budget policy was 
adopted to ensure the re-entry of Italy into the EMS and entrance into EMU (Antichi 
and Pizzuti, 2000).  Similarly, Gordon Clark (2001) suggests that the terms of global 
finance may cause continental Europe to accommodate their pension policies to 
pension schemes that are “at odds with continental political traditions” (p.  4).  
Although changes in the international economy may be necessary to promote pension 
reform it is still not a sufficient condition due to the political dynamics associated 
with pension policy.  Thus, we have still not seen significant pension policy changes 
in Western Europe more recently.   
  Whereas the ‘industrial logic’ literature highlights economic factors some 
public policy theorists suggest that ideas or belief systems explains policy reform 
(Sabatier, 1988; Sikkink, 1990; Clark, 2000).  This theoretical body suggests that 
policy change relates to changes in belief systems and the influence of ideas 
themselves.  In relation to pension policy it appears that certain models of pension 
policy have gained support and have been put in practice.  Some suggests that the 
Anglo-American model has become the predominant model of economics and 
pension reform (Clark, 2000; Aglietta, 2000).  The Anglo-American model focuses 
on neo-liberal ideas and places emphasis upon the “balance between government and 
private provisions of retirement income and the benefits of market provision rather 
than the threats posed by demography are at the core of the debate.” (Clark, 2000: 4).  
Such a model incorporates “acceptance of levels of risk and inequality at odds with 
continental political traditions” (Clark, 2000: 4; Bonoli, 2000).   
  The policy reform proposals being discussed in EU member states and policy 
proposals from the European Commission support the idea that the Anglo-American 
model is becoming a popular policy option.  The impact of ideas, however, begs the 
question how these ideas become popular and why elites choose to adopt certain 
policies over others.  Thus, it seems that ideas need a vehicle in which to have an 
impact. 
  Institutionalism may provide greater explanatory value to identify what 
influences pension policy choices and reform.  Political institutions are collections of 
interrelated “rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations 
between roles and situations (March and Olsen, 1989:160).”  One institutionalist 
approach to understand public policy suggests that the variation of policies across 
countries within the same policy sector is explained either by the political structure 
hypothesis or the policy style hypothesis (Lane and Ersson, 1994).  The political 
structure hypothesis suggests variation of policies within the same sector across       19
countries since decision-making structures play a significant role in the way policies 
are created and implemented (Lane and Ersson, 1994).  Thus, structural 
characteristics within countries determine policy choices more than the policy issue 
itself.  On the other hand, the policy style hypothesis explains the variation in the 
same policy sector across countries also due to structural differences of policy-
making and implementation, but this hypothesis also takes into account that changes 
in time and tradition can alter these structures.  The underlying basis of the policy 
structure and policy style hypotheses is that institutions shape public policy. 
  Epsing-Andersen's (1990) seminal work incorporates an institutionalist 
approach to categorize types of welfare states.  The typology created focuses on the 
variation of regime types in reference to welfare states.  The three major typologies of 
Epsing-Andersen include Scandinavian or social democratic, Anglo-Saxon or liberal 
welfare states and Continental or corporatist welfare states.  Later literature suggests 
that Southern European countries namely, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal follow a 
distinct model (Ferrera, 1997; Rhodes, 1996, 1997).  Epsing-Andersen demonstrated 
that the perceived role of the state, the logic of state activity and the view of what 
private and public realms should provide determined the kinds of welfare policies 
adopted.   
  In the context of pension policy Epsing-Andersen (1990) distinguishes two 
types of pension schemes: public and private.  Public systems basically refer to the 
PAYG system, pillar 1 whereby current taxation and social security contributors 
finance current pension payouts.  On the other hand, private systems, other wise 
called capital systems include either occupational pension plans or individual 
annuities, pillars 2 and 3.  The institutionalist approach asserts that the variation of 
pension schemes across countries is based upon culturally defined ideals concerning 
what is the appropriate role of the state.  These rules and structure of the state are a 
reflection of embedded societal beliefs and structures.  As ideals become 
institutionalized they also become reinforced.  Institutionally entrenched ideas 
regarding the relationship between public and private sectors define the responsibility 
of government and contribute to the formulation of pension policies. As a result, 
pension reform has occurred at a slow rate.  In this way, institutionalism provides a 
convincing argument to explain why pension schemes vary across countries and 
remain varied. 
  Another model to understand government pension policy choices emphasizes 
the role of politically mobilized groups.  In particular this approach highlights the 
importance  of protest, labor unions and ideologically left leaning political parties in 
the creation and type of pension policies within countries (Lagares, 2000; Antichi and 
Pizzuti, 2000; Guillén, 1992, 1999).  For instance, in Italy the long time awaited 
pension r eforms only came about with the inclusion of labor unions in the reform 
process (Antichi and Pizzuti, 2000).  Pension reform, since it is a controversial topic 
needs strong public support.  Lack of public support has resulted in major political 
failures.  For instance, in France during Alain Juppé’s term and in Italy under Silvio 
Berlusconi massive public protest regarding pension reform significantly contributed 
to the fall of these governments.       20
  The four approaches to explain pension policy choices, reform or lack thereof, 
each provides a certain amount of explanatory value, however it seems that political 
mobilization and institutional approaches provide more explanatory value.  It must be 
kept in mind, however, that these approaches were designed to understand pension 
reform in the context of domestic politics.  Within an integrated Europe will these 
approaches, specifically institutionalism and political mobilization, have the same 
explanatory significance? 
 
The unique position of the institutions of the EU  
The EU presents a unique political arena that can alter significantly the policy options 
available for pension policy reform.  First, the EU itself is a forum for discussion and 
debate.  In this way, countries interact on a regular basis and share and provide ideas 
creating new policy networks or epistemic communities.  Thus, different policy ideas 
can be introduced to pertinent political agents that may otherwise have not emerged 
within domestic dialogues regarding pension reform.  Second, the interdependence of 
the economies of EU members and particularly the twelve members of the monetary 
union presents an unusual situation, whereby member states are increasingly 
concerned with the economic well being of their partners for their own self-interest.  
Thus, member states may become more vocal regarding the domestic policies of 
other members.  In the past, it was unheard of for foreign governments to critique the 
type of pension policy chosen within a country
14.  With deeper European integration 
we are beginning to see countries that have relatively more successful pension 
policies pressuring the countries with less effective policies to reform.  For instance 
there have been some rumblings from Dutch officials demanding the Italians to 
reform their PAYG pension system (interview, 2000).   
Third, the EU itself has become an agenda setter for national policy makers.  
Although the EU in certain sectors cannot usurp the powers of the national or 
regional governments it can present certain parameters that promote the adoption of 
certain policy options above others.  In this way, the EU can constrain the policy-
making autonomy of national governments (Ferrera, 2000).  European Monetary 
Union and other policy initiatives have placed the Commission in a unique position to 
have significant influence upon member states’ pension policy choices.    
Fourth, the EU provides a useful buffer for political leaders.  Within a strictly 
domestic arena, political pressures regarding pension reform can come from labor 
groups and public protest.  It is clear that pension reform is a highly contested policy 
area and there are many strong domestic actors that can block policy reform.  On the 
other hand, the EU provides a “scapegoat” mechanism that allows public officials to 
adopt unpopular policy options that are EU suggested or imposed.  In response to 
public outrage, public officials can point the proverbial finger at Brussels and as a 
result avoid political heat.  Such practice was seen in Italy and Spain while they 
implemented austerity measures to meet the convergence criteria of monetary union 
membership. For example, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the opposition in Italy, stated 
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during the election campaign that ‘No acquired pension rights will be touched’ but 
‘What we have to do will be based on what Europe will impose on us’
15 
  The EU has transformed domestic politics through its re-allocation of 
competencies to different levels of government and its affect upon the role of 
domestic actors and institutions to influence policy-making (Marks et. al., 1996). The 
EU itself is a unique institution that like domestic institutional structures has its own 
“rules and routines that define appropriate action.” (March and Olsen, 1989: 160).  
Theorists suggest that the Commission and other EU institutions have moved forward 
the process of integration (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Burley-Slaughter, 1991; Alter 
and Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994).   
  Fifth, the impact of domestically mobilized groups at the EU level is quite 
different than within the domestic realm.  As mentioned earlier, in the domestic realm 
labor unions and other forms of political mobilization have influenced the passage or 
blockage of pension reform.  In the context of the EU, representation and the ability 
or willingness of domestic interests to change the EU policy arena is significantly 
altered.   
One, political leaders within most of the institutions of the EU are not directly elected 
officials.  The only EU institution composed of directly elected official is the 
European Parliament.  Hence, one of the major critiques of the EU is its democratic 
deficit.  Such critiques tend to focus on the absence of directly elected officials in the 
two most influential institutions: the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers.  Although the Maastricht treaty attempted to empower the European 
parliament many critics suggest that the change is not sufficient to remedy the deficit.  
As a result, policy-makers at the European level do not have the same electoral 
pressures as those within member states.   
  Two, political mobilization at the EU level differs significantly from 
mobilization at the domestic level.  Often organized interests lobbying or protesting 
EU policies do not choose to do so at the EU level.  Instead, organized interests 
prefer to operate within the domestic arena since that is where their resources and 
networks are located (Imig and Tarrow, 2001).  Although European labor unions do 
have representation at the EU level, they do not have the same kind of impact at the 
EU level as  they do within domestic politics. In Brussels, business is better 
represented and the objectives of different European companies are fairly well 
aligned, such that they forcefully and unanimously argue for fairly deep cuts in 
pension provisions in a common report, entitled ‘European Pensions, an appeal for 
reform (European Round Table of Industrialists, 2000). Their counterpart, the 
European Trade Union Confederation, is far more divided: national trade unions in 
countries which prefunded systems are wary o f calling for integration in Europe, 
because that implies they have to pay and all are weary to call for cuts. Consequently 
their resolutions on pension reform are full of compromise: 
 
                                                                 
15 Interview on Radio Anch’io, February 20, 2001. These quotes are taken from the official web site of Forza Italia, the 
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As regards the financial aspects, it is vital to establish a minimum number 




Without specification this phrase remains rather empty. 
 
EU activity in pension policy 
  Most scholars that examine the role of the EU in social policy suggest that thus 
far the role of the EU has been quite limited.  The EU’s insertion into pension policy 
has developed slowly over time.  The Commission has had two aims: 1) to make sure 
national pension regulations fairly treat people who move between countries, and 2) 
to create a single market for pillar 2 and 3 pensions. More recently it has started to 
promote an increased role for pillar 2 and 3 at the cost of pillar 1, which is nine times 
as large as the other two combined.
17 
In 1971 regulation 1408/71
18 was enacted to ensured workers who had lived and paid 
contributions in several Member States were treated fairly along with their 
dependents.  Following this regulation an enormous amount of case law arose over 
the years which has been favorable for migrant workers. In July 1990 in his effort to 
create a single market Sir Leon Brittan announced a sweeping directive, which would 
both protect the occupational pension (second pillar) of a migrant worker and create a 
single market for pensions
19. The commission sent a draft proposal to the Council in 
October 1991. The Member States fiercely opposed the provisions in the bill and the 
proposal became watered down. These objections were reinforced by the collapse of 
the ERM in 1992 and 1993, during which countries faced massive speculative attacks 
against their currencies: the last thing they desired was to enable another large 
amount of money to be able to move to other countries.  
In the end a country would still be able to force a pension fund to hold 60% in 
matching (i.e. domestic) currency. Among others, France still wanted 80%, but the 
Commission refused and took a highly unusual tact and withdrew the draft directive 
on December 6 1994. Eleven days later it published an almost unchanged proposal as 
a communication in the official journal
20, which by-passed the Council. France went 
to the European Court of Justice, which duly annulled the communication
2122.  
Following the Court’s decision the Commission was back at square one.  
Another attempt to put pension policy on the Commission’s docket re-emerged with 
the creation of a  high level working group.  The group, led by Simone Veil, formed 
in 1996 and proposed a directive, which only dealt with the first issue: the pillar 2 
provisions for migrant workers. The Commission thus proposed a working group 
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3.4 
17 European Commission (1997) 
18 Regulation 1408/71, articles 44-51. Article 51 is modified by Council regulation No 118/97  
19 In 2001, a multinational active in 15 EU countries, still has to run 15 pension funds. 
20 94/c 360/08 
21 Case C-57/95 France v Commission, decision of the court: OJ C 142, 10.5.1997  
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directive to the Council in October 1997. Following agreement at the 1998 
Luxemburg Council meeting, the directive became effective on June 28 1998
23  By 
June 2001, countries are to implement the directive. 
The thorny issue of a free market for supplementary pensions, the second 
Commission aim, was addressed in a green paper published October 1997
24. After a 
long consultation process, in which the Commission ensured itself of a mandate with 
the Council conclusions in Lisbon and Maria de Feira, it finally published a proposal 
for a directive in 2000 and sent it to the Council and parliament
25, who under the 
Maastricht rules, now have to take co-decision. The proposal forces member states to 
abolish most of the restrictive rules on investment allocation and enables migrant 
workers to stay in their old pension scheme, when they are on an assignment in 
another country. It stops short of giving workers the option to shop around for 
pensions in the EU, as this would require a great deal of tax  harmonization. The 
Commission currently is promising a proposal to deal with this issue. 
In preparing the Member States for this directive, the Commission has taken an 
increasingly proactive approach.  In May of 1999, the Commission issued a 
communication  summarizing critiques solicited from member states in reaction to a 
Green Paper dealing with pension reform (European Commission, 1999).  The 
Commission communication asserts that pension schemes are an important policy 
that remains within the domain of nation-states.  However, the communication 
proposes the creation of a Community framework to promote the creation and 
sustainability of funded supplementary pensions.  Specifically, the document 
highlights the burden demographic changes will have upon public expenditure.  Thus, 
as a way to help fund public pensions the document supports the policy of 
supplemental pensions and proposes a European plan to ensure their development. 
  Within the Commission communication there is an interesting member state 
critique of the Green paper.  Member states felt that the Commission did not 
emphasize sufficiently the social aspect of pensions, but instead focused more on 
“pension funds as a vehicle to create European capital markets” (European 
Commission, 1999a: 10).  In response to this criticism, the Commission conceded to 
put the protection of beneficiaries as a priority.  However, the Commission stated that 
the “role that EU capital market integration can play in favor of growth and 
employment should not be disregarded:  efficient and transparent financial markets 
can facilitate access to capital and enhance capital productivity” (European 
Commission, 1999a: 11).  It is clear from this statement and others that will be 
discussed that the EU’s reason for wanting to play an agenda setting role in pension 
policy is distinct from traditional domestic reasons for pension policy reform.   
  In the past, pension policies were used to either help the poor, provide socio-
economic stability or to quell political pressures from labor.  In the context of the EU, 
it seems that the underlying reason driving the EU’s interest in pension reform is the 
preservation of the European Monetary Union and more generally strengthening of 
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the European economy.  Thus, the EU and its policy-makers will tackle the issue of 
pension reform from a very different perspective than member states might. 
  In August of 1999 the European Commission published a document with the 
help of reports from member states.  This report, “The Evolution of Social Protection 
in the Member States” summarized the various kinds of social policies linked to 
employment, retirement and health.  Specifically, the report emphasizes the 
problematic nature of pension reform within member states.   
 
The social security tasks themselves, as well as the institutions responsible 
for managing such tasks, continue to be a matter for discussion in a number 
of countries.  The various underlying balances and compromises of social 
security –which are specific to each country—such as the link between the 
public and private sector are a particular subject of debate.  The 
acknowledgement of financial difficulties or the anticipation of financial 
deadlock, especially in the retirement pension sphere…casts doubt on the 
long term viability of certain branches of the social security system if 
legislation does not change.  However, despite the clear resolve to 
implement changes in some cases, such changes are introduced only 
sporadically and in a way that is highly controversial…(European 
Commission, 2000b: 6)      
 
From this report the Commission demonstrated the need for reform as well as the 
problems within the domestic arena blocking change.  From the tone of this 
publication it seems that the Commission began to assert itself as a mechanism or 
conduit to help push forward needed pension reform. 
In October of 2000, the Commission published a communication to the European 
Council, European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee as an 
outcome of the Council’s Lisbon meeting in March 2000.  The Lisbon meeting 
enabled a High Level Working Party
26 on Social Protection to prepare a report based 
upon past Commission communications and work done by the Economic Policy 
Committee.  The purpose of this report is to pay particular attention to the 
“sustainability of pension systems in different time frameworks up to 2020 and 
beyond, where necessary.” (European Commission, 2000).   
  The October communication presented a very direct reference to EU 
involvement in setting the policy agenda within member states.  The communication 
states: 
 
While each Member State remains responsible for its pension system, it is clear that 
they also have much to learn from each other.  Furthermore, the sustainability of 
pension systems will determine to a significant extent the European Union’s ability to 
achieve the promotion of a high level of social protection, which is one of the 
fundamental objectives defined in Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European 
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Community.  This is why the European Council has called for co-operative exchange 
on the future sustainability of pension systems (European Commission, 2000:2). 
 
In December of 2000 the Presidency of the Council following the meeting in Nice 
reiterated the desire of the EU to promote co-operation among member states 
regarding pension reform. 
 
The European Council approves the Council’s approach, which involves a 
comprehensive assessment of the sustainability and quality of retirement pension 
systems.  The European Council invites Member States, in cooperation with the 
Commission, to exchange their experience and present their national strategies in this 
area.  The results of this preliminary overall study on the long-term viability of 
pensions should be available for the European Council meeting in Stockholm 
(European Council, 2000:art 20). 
 
In February, prior to the meeting in Stockholm the Commission published a proposal 
regarding occupational retirement (European Commission, 2001).  In this explanatory 
memorandum the Commission expressed the need for a “Community legal 
framework covering institutions for occupational retirement provision.”(European 
Commission, 2001; art. 1.1).  According to the proposal, 
The Lisbon European Council placed strong emphasis on the need to integrate 
financial services and markets within the Union.  A single financial market will be a 
key factor in promoting the competitiveness of the European economy, the 
development of the new economy and social cohesion.  That is why Heads of State 
and Government called for the Financial Services Action Plan to be implemented by 
2005.  In it conclusion the Presidency stresses that priority must be given to removing 
barriers to investment in the field of pensions (European Commission, 2001, 
preamble) 
 
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein’s speech entitled “Diffusing Europe’s Pension Time 
bomb” reinforces the sense that there should be a European response to the problems 
facing pensions.  Bolkestein explains, “The Commission is encouraging member 
states to set in place a comprehensive reform process.” (Bolkestein, 2001).  
Specifically, he points out the need for  
 
Running down public debt at a faster pace so as to lower the interest 
burden and offset increased pension spending; 
Raising employment rates, especially of older workers and women, so as to 
reduce the ratio of dependants to active workers 
Proceeding with further reforms of public pension systems, including 
moves toward greater reliance on funding (Bolkstein, 2001). 
 
Similarly, following the first day of the European Council’s meeting in Stockholm, 
Commissioner Solbes asserted that the Council endorsed the Commission’s push to 
get “member states to develop comprehensive strategies” (Solbes, 2001).         26
  The outcome of the Stockholm meeting sets up certain objectives of the EU.  
One objective is to act in accordance with the Commission’s October 2000 proposal 
and to invite Member States to strengthen their cooperation regarding pension.  In 
addition, the Council also stated its support for “cooperation between Member States 
on the modernization of pension systems to ensure their sustainability in the context 
of economic demographic changes.” (www.europa.eu.int, 2001).   
The Commission’s and European Central Bank’s numerous alarming reports 
regarding the forecasted failure of pensions have convinced a number of governments 
that reform and specific kinds of reform are needed.  For instance, Prime Ministers 
Kok, of the Netherlands, and José Mariá Aznar, of Spain, at the Econfin Council on 
March 6 2001, presented a proposal calling for a greater amount of prefunding in the 
Union
27. The topic was subsequently discussed at the European Council in Stockholm 
on March 23-24, which concluded that  
 
"…Where appropriate, the potential of the open method of coordination 
should be used to the full, particularly in the field of pensions, taking due 
account of the principle of subsidiarity..."
28  
 
It is clear that the more recent Commission proposals and Council meetings suggest 
that the EU in the future will take a more active role in promoting cooperation of 
pension policies among member states and promoting certain pension options, i.e. 
funded pensions. The Commission has recognized that demographic changes 
necessitate pension reform.  Moreover, the impact pensions have upon capital 
markets and public pensions are also of concern for the EU with its desire to create a 
strong and viable integrated market, economy and monetary system.  The 
Commission cannot nor is attempting to usurp the policy-making autonomy of 
member states regarding pensions, however, it seems that the Commission is 
attempting to act as an important agenda setter of domestic politics regarding pension 
reform and while it is not seizing the policy-making autonomy, it is indirectly 
limiting it by its very actions: once pension funds fall under the European free 
market, the Commission has managed to exert a strong European influence on the 
largest asset within the European Union. 
 
Conclusions 
Pension reform is of grave concern for many countries in West Europe.  It seems, 
however, that p ension reform must be understood under the lens of increased 
European integration and greater globalization. Earlier work, which does not consider 
the European dimension of domestic policy leaves out an important variable.  
Currently, an EU directive aiming to harmonize rules has been proposed, whereas a 
second one dealing with tax harmonization is under way. These two proposals have 
the possibility to limit the choices of national policy makers when they reform their 
respective pension systems. 
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Due to the  economic arguments discussed advocating increased cooperation in 
pension reform:, it seems that the European Union would be the most obvious agent 
to initiate cooperation. The process of increased integration makes such cooperation 
ever more desirable, a fact which most policy makers are now slowly accepting.  For 
instance, Aznar and Kok's recent proposal demonstrates that some Member States are 
even willing to put reform on the European agenda. Furthermore the above discussion 
demonstrates the clear link between EMU participation and  prefunding of pensions 
respectively the current speed of reform.  
Although national governments still play a significant role in pension policy and its 
reform it is clear that the EU is taking a more active role setting the agenda for reform 
within member states.  The unique institutional design of the EU and its facilitation of 
interdependence among member states has created a situation whereby the EU is 
becoming increasingly active in policy areas once the domain of domestic actors.  
Likewise, pension policy, a highly contested domestic issue, is being dealt with at the 
European level.  Proposals currently being discussed in Brussels may even increase 
the role of the EU in pension reform.       28
Bibliography 
Adnenas, Mads. “Financial Market Regulation and the Case Law”  European 
Business Law Review, May/June 1998, pp 203-207 
 
Antichi, Massimo and Felice Roberto Pizzuti. “The Public Pension System in Italy: 
Observations on the Recent Reforms, Methods of Control and their Application.” In 
Emmanuel Reynaud (ed) Social Dialogue and Pension Reform. Geneva: International 
Labour Organization, 2000. 
 
Auerbach, J. Allan, Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Willi Leibfitz (eds).  Generational 
Accounting around the World, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999 
 
Bolkestein, Frits. “Defusing Europe’s Time bomb.”  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/speeches/spch52.htm, February 6, 
2001.  
 
Bonoli, Giuliano. The Politics of Pension Reform: Institutions and Policy Change in 
Western Europe.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Burley, Anne-Marie and Walter Mattli.  “Europe Before the Court: A Political 
Theory of Legal Integration.”  International Organization. Winter (p 41-76), 1993. 
 
Burley Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “New Directions in Legal Research in the European 
Community.”  Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.31, September, 1991.  
 
Clark, Gordon.  “European Pensions and Global Finance: continuity or 
convergence?” paper presented at the  American Geographers Association Annual 
Conference. February 12, 2001. 
 
Covip (Commissione di Vigilianza sui fondi pensione)  Relazione Annuale 1999, 
Rome, 2000. 
 
Disney (1996), Can we afford to grow old?, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996. 
 
Dudek, Carolyn. "The EU's Impact Upon Regional Government Policy-making 
Ability." Regional and Federal Studies. 11:2, Spring 2001. 
 
Epsing-Andersen, G. Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.  Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990. 
 
----Politics Against Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985  
 
European Commission. Supplementary Pension in the Single Market, a Green Paper, 
COM 97/283, 1997       29
 
----,Commission Communication: Towards a Single Market for Supplementary 
Pension. COM (99) 134, October 5, 1999a. 
 
----,Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament 
and to the Economic and Social Committee. COM (2000) 622 final, Brussels, 
October 11, 2000a. 
 
----,Directorate General for employment and Social Affairs.  Evolution  of Social 
Protection in the Member States.  Unit EMPL/E.2, August 2000b. 
 
----“Proposal for a directive for the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
activities of institutions for occupational retirement.” Document 500PC0507, 
February 19, 2001. 
 
European Council. “Presidency Conclusions: Nice European Council Meeting.” 
http://eurolandia.tin…entazione/17/nizza_conclusioni.htm  December 9, 2000.  
 
European Round Table of Industrialists, European Pensions: An Appeal for Reform, 
Brussels, 2000 (downloadable, www.ert.be) 
 
Eurostat. European Social Statistics, Demography, 2000. 
 
Feldstein (ed.)  Privatizing Social Security. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999. 
 
Ferrera, M. "The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe."  Journal of 
European Social Policy. 6:1, pp 17-37, 1996. 
 
Flora, Peter. (ed.)  Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States since 
World War II. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986. 
 
Guillén, Ana.  “Social Policy i n Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy (1939-
1982).” In Zsuzsa Ferge and Jon Eivind Kolberg (eds.) Social Policy in a Changing 
Europe.  Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 
 
----“Pension Reform in Spain (1975-1997): The Role of Organized Labour.” 
European University Institute Working Paper, EUF No. 99.6, 1999..   
 
Imig, Doug and Sidney Tarrow. Contentious Europeans: protest and politics in an 
emerging polity.  Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 
 
Keating, Michael.  The Regional Dimmension of Political Economy.  Frank Cass, 
1998. 
       30
Lagares Pérez, Ana Maria. “The Process of Pension Reform in Spain. In Emmanuel 
Reynaud (ed)  Social Dialogue and Pension Reform. Geneva: International Labour 
Organization, 2000. 
 
Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson.  Politics and Society in Western Europe. London: 
Sage Publications, 1994. 
 
Leibfried, S. and Pierson, P. (eds.). European Social Policy: between Fragmentation 
and Integration.  Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1996.  
 
Majone, Giandomenico, Regulating Europe, London, Routledge, 1996 
 
March, James and Johan Olsen.  Rediscovering Institutions.  New York: The Free 
Press, 1989. 
 
Marks, Gary Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank.  “European Integration for the 
1980’s: State Centric v Multi-level Governance.”  Journal of  Common Market 
Studies. 34:342-377, 1996. 
 
Merton, Robert, “On the role of social security as a means for efficient risk sharing in 
an economy where human capital is not tradeable” in Zvi Bodie and John Shoven, 
eds. Issues in Pension Economics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983) 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Nasjonalbudsjettet 2001, Oslo, 2000 
 
Omtzigt, Pieter. Interview with Jan Peter Balkenende, Dutch member of parliament, 
July, 2000. 
 
----. Pension reform in a monetary union, manuscript, Insubria University, 2001 
 
Pemberton, James, “Social Security: National policies with international 
implications” , Economic Journal 109, pp 492-508, 1999 
 
---. National and international privatization of pensions, European Economic Review 
44, pp 1873-1896, 2000 
 
Phillips & Drew. Pension Fund Indicators, a long-term perspective on pension fund 
investment 2000, London, 2000 
 
Quadagno, J. “Generational Equity and the Politics of the Welfare State.”  Politics 
and Society.  17:3, pp 353-376, 1989. 
 
Ross, Fiona. "Framing Welfare Reform in Affluent Societies: Rendering 
Retrenchment more Palatable?" European University Institute Working Paper, RSC 
No. 2000/15. 2000.       31
 
Rhodes, Martin. "Southern European Welfare States." South European Society and 
Politics. 1:3, pp. 1-22, 1996. 
 
---- (ed). Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform. London: 
Frank Cass, 1997. 
 
Sabatier, Paul. “An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of 
policy-oriented learning therein.” Policy Sciences 21:129-168, 1988) 
 
Schmitter, Phillipe and L embruch, G. (eds.)  Trends Toward Corporatist 
Intermediation. London: Sage Press, 1979. 
 
Scharpf, Fritz W. "The Viability of Advanced Welfare States in the International 
Economy: Vulnerabilities and Options."  Max Planck Institute Working Paper, 99/9, 
September 1999. 
 
Sikkink, Kathryn.  Development ideas and economic policy in Latin America.  New 
York, N.Y. : Columbia University, Institute of Latin American and Iberian 
Studies,1990. 
 
Solbes, Pedro Mira.  Commission Press Conference. 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/stockholm_council/index.htm, March 23, 2001. 
 
       32
 





  Old age 
dependency ratio 
in 2050 
North-West   
UK  48.5 
Ireland  46.6 
Finland  50.6 
Sweden  48.5 
Denmark  43.7 
NL  46.9 
Central   
Belgium  52.0 
Luxembourg  43.5 
Germany  56.1 
France  53.2 
Austria  57.7 
Mediterranean   
Italy  69.7 
Spain  68.7 
Portugal  50.9 
Greece  61.6 
 
 
 